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V. ad imaginem Dei creavit illum
2. The Anthropomorphic Delusion (complete text)
As I say, the anthropomorphic theory of the world is made absurd by modern biology--but that is
not saying, of course, that it will ever be abandoned by the generality of men. To the contrary,
they will cherish it in proportion as it becomes more and more dubious. Today, indeed, it is
cherished as it was never cherished in the Ages of Faith, when the doctrine that man was godlike was at least ameliorated by the doctrine that woman was vile. What else is behind charity,
philanthropy, pacifism, Socialism, the uplift, all the rest of the current sentimentalities? One and
all, these sentimentalities are based upon the notion that man is a glorious and ineffable animal,
and that his continued existence in the world ought to be facilitated and insured. But this notion
is obviously full of fatuity. As animals go, even in so limited a space as our world, man is
botched and ridiculous.
Few other brutes are so stupid or so cowardly. The commonest yellow dog has far sharper senses
and is infinitely more courageous, not to say more honest and dependable. The ants and the bees
are, in many ways, far more intelligent and ingenious; they manage their government with vastly
less quarreling, wastefulness and imbecility. The lion is more beautiful, more dignified, more
majestic. The antelope is swifter and more graceful. The ordinary house-cat is cleaner. The
horse, foamed by labor, has a better smell. The gorilla is kinder to his children and more faithful
to his wife. The ox and the ass are more industrious and serene. But most of all, man is deficient
in courage, perhaps the noblest quality of them all. He is not only mortally afraid of all other
animals of his own weight or half his weight--save a few that he has debased by artificial
inbreeding; he is even mortally afraid of his own kind--and not only of their fists and hooves, but
even of their sniggers.
No other animal is so defectively adapted to its environment. The human infant, as it comes into
the world, is so puny that if it were neglected for two days running it would infallibly perish, and
this congenital infirmity, though more or less concealed later on, persists until death. Man is ill
far more than any other animal, both in his savage state and under civilization. He has more
different diseases and he suffers from them oftener. He is easier exhausted and injured. He dies
more horribly and usually sooner. Practically all the other higher vertebrates, at least in their wild
state, live longer and retain their faculties to a greater age. Here even the anthropoid apes are far
beyond their human cousins. An orang-outang marries at the age of seven or eight, raises a
family of seventy or eighty children, and is still as hale and hearty at eighty as a European at
forty-five.
All the errors and incompetencies of the Creator reach their climax in man. As a piece of
mechanism he is the worst of them all; put beside him, even a salmon or a staphylococcus is a
sound and efficient machine. He has the worst kidneys known to comparative zoology, and
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the worst lungs, and the worst heart. His eye, considering the work it is called upon to do, is less
efficient than the eye of an earth-worm; an optical instrument maker who made an instrument so
clumsy would be mobbed by his customers. Alone of all animals, terrestrial, celestial or marine,
man is unfit by nature to go abroad in the world he inhabits. He must clothe himself, protect
himself, swathe himself, armor himself. He is eternally in the position of a turtle born without
a shell, a dog without hair, a fish without fins. Lacking his heavy and cumbersome trappings, he
is defenseless even against flies. As God made him he hasn't even a tail to switch them off.
I now come to man's one point of unquestionable natural superiority: he has a soul. This is what
sets him off from all other animals, and makes him, in a way, their master. The exact nature of
that soul has been in dispute for thousands of years, but regarding its function it is possible to
speak with some authority. That function is to bring man into direct contact with God, to make
him aware of God, above all, to make him resemble God. Well, consider the colossal failure of
the device! If we assume that man actually does resemble God, then we are forced into the
impossible theory that God is a coward, an idiot and a bounder. And if we assume that man, after
all these years, does not resemble God, then it appears at once that the human soul is as
inefficient a machine as the human liver or tonsil, and that man would probably be better off, as
the chimpanzee undoubtedly is better off, without it.
Such, indeed, is the case. The only practical effect of having a soul is that it fills man with
anthropomorphic and anthropocentric vanities--in brief with cocky and preposterous
superstitions. He struts and plumes himself because he has this soul--and overlooks the fact that
it doesn't work. Thus, he is the supreme clown of creation, the reductio ad absurdum of animated
nature. He is like a cow who believed that she could jump over the moon, and ordered her whole
life upon that theory. He is like a bullfrog boasting eternally of fighting lions, of flying over the
Matterhorn, and of swimming the Hellespont. And yet this is the poor brute we are asked to
venerate as a gem in the forehead of the cosmos! This is the worm we are asked to defend
as God's favorite on earth, with all its millions of braver, nobler, decenter quadrupeds--its superb
lions, its lithe and gallant leopards, its imperial elephants, its honest dogs, its courageous rats!
This is the insect we are besought, at infinite trouble, labor and expense, to reproduce!
5. Coda (complete text)
To sum up:
1. The cosmos is a gigantic fly-wheel making 10,000 revolutions a minute.
2. Man is a sick fly taking a dizzy ride on it.
3. Religion is the theory that the wheel was designed and set spinning to give him the ride.

https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/ije/vol3/iss1/8

4

Board: American Letters

III. Footnote on Criticism (excerpts)
“[…] Truth, indeed, is something that is believed in completely only by persons who have never
tried personally to pursue it to its fastnesses and grab it by the tail. It is the adoration of secondrate men—men who always receive it at second hand. Pedagogues believe in immutable truths
and spend their lives trying to determine them and propagate them; the intellectual progress of
man consists largely of a concerted effort to block and destroy their enterprise. Nine times out of
ten, in the arts as in life, there is actually no truth to be discovered; there is only error to be
exposed. In whole departments of human inquiry it seems to me quite unlikely that the truth ever
will be discovered. Nevertheless, the rubber-stamp thinking of the world always makes the
assumption that the exposure of an error is identical with the discovery of the truth--that error
and truth are simple opposites. They are nothing of the sort. What the world turns to, when it has
been cured of one error, is usually simply another error, and maybe one worse than the first one.
This is the whole history of the intellect in brief. The average man of today does not believe in
precisely the same imbecilities that the Greek of the fourth century before Christ believed in, but
the things that he does believe in are often quite as idiotic. Perhaps this statement is a bit too
sweeping. There is, year by year, a gradual accumulation of what may be called, provisionally,
truths--there is a slow accretion of ideas that somehow manage to meet all practicable human
tests, and so survive. But even so, it is risky to call them absolute truths. All that one may safely
say of them is that no one, as yet, has demonstrated that they are errors. Soon or late, if
experience teaches us anything, they are likely to succumb too. The profoundest truths of the
Middle Ages are now laughed at by schoolboys. The profoundest truths of democracy will be
laughed at, a few centuries hence, even by school teachers.
[…]
The demand for "constructive" criticism is based upon the same false assumption that immutable
truths exist in the arts, and that the artist will be improved by being made aware of them. This
notion, whatever the form it takes, is always absurd--as much so, indeed, as its brother delusion
that the critic, to be competent, must be a practitioner of the specific art he ventures to deal with,
i. e., that a doctor, to cure a belly ache, must have a belly ache. As practically encountered, it is
disingenuous as well as absurd, for it comes chiefly from bad artists who tire of serving as
performing monkeys, and crave the greater ease and safety of sophomores in class. They demand
to be taught in order to avoid being knocked about. In their demand is the theory that instruction,
if they could get it, would profit them—that they are capable of doing better work than they do.
As a practical matter, I doubt that this is ever true. Bad poets never actually grow any better; they
invariably grow worse and worse. In all history there has never been, to my knowledge, a single
practitioner of any art who, as a result of "constructive" criticism, improved his work. The curse
of all the arts, indeed, is the fact that they are constantly invaded by persons who are not artists at
all--persons whose yearning to express their ideas and feelings is unaccompanied by the slightest
capacity for charming expression--in brief, persons with absolutely nothing to say. This is
particularly true of the art of letters, which interposes very few technical obstacles to the vanity
and garrulity of such invaders. Any effort to teach them to write better is an effort
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wasted, as every editor discovers for himself; they are as incapable of it as they are of jumping
over the moon. The only sort of criticism that can deal with them to any profit is the sort that
employs them frankly as laboratory animals. It cannot cure them, but it can at least make an
amusing and perhaps edifying show of them. It is idle to argue that the good in them is thus
destroyed with the bad. The simple answer is that there is no good in them. Suppose Poe had
wasted his time trying to dredge good work out of Rufus Dawes, author of "Geraldine." He
would have failed miserably--and spoiled a capital essay, still diverting after three-quarters of a
century. Suppose Beethoven, dealing with Gottfried Weber, had tried laboriously to make an
intelligent music critic of him. How much more apt, useful and durable the simple note: "Archass! Double-barrelled ass!" Here was absolutely sound criticism. Here was a judgment wholly
beyond challenge. Moreover, here was a small but perfect work of art. […]”
ↈↈↈ
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